By Steven Jonas, MD, MPH – August 1, 2007
I have visited and re-visited this topic several times over
the course of the three-plus years that I have been writing this column.
It’s time to re-visit it again, it seems to me. More and more
politicians, political commentators, and ordinary citizens have come to or are
coming to the conclusion that the time to leave is upon us or will be in the
relatively near future (but in any event before the 2008 elections ---
especially if you are a Republican). Bush, of course, totally rejects
this. To date most of the discussion has been based on the assumption
that Bush’s position on the war is that it will end when one or more of his
many definitions of “victory” have been achieved.
As I have said in this space and others over the past some
months now, it is becoming ever more clear that Bush is not out to achieve any
kind of “victory” in Iraq, from finding WMD to overthrowing Hussein to the
holding of elections to “ending the violence.” Rather, his objective is
to maintain Permanent War there. (Recent projections from his hand-picked
military commanders are for a militarily active US presence for anywhere from 2
[New York Times, July 24, 2007] to 10 years.) However, the time has not
yet come where one can effectively and productively put that one forward on the
political agenda. And it happens, fortunately, that one does not have to
engage in the discussion of what Bush’s true aims are in order to deal both
rationally and politically with the question of “How Does the US Get Out?”
Right now the Georgites have been able to focus the
discussion on an either/or scenario. Either the US stays indefinitely or
the US leaves precipitously and there will be a bloodbath of enormous magnitude
(as if there had not already been such an one). Unfortunately, many on
the side of withdrawal, and better sooner rather than later, have done that
too. Like Bush’s “we’ll stay until the job is done” (whatever the job
is), these are positions that focus only on the US and what our forces should
and will be doing and not doing. Thus, we see headline after headline
like the one that appeared in Newsday on July 22, 2007: “Critics fear
quick exit.” This plays right into the hands of the Georgites.
The political discussion thus is not over the questions of
“what is the US doing there” and “why it should leave.” These are
questions to which answers can be found that are not based on
speculation. Discussion on these questions is not useful for the Georgites.
As long as the discussion focuses, as it so often does now, on “what will
happen when the US leaves,” any answers must perforce be based on speculation.
And their speculation is as good as ours. Should the US just up and
leave in one way or another, yes indeed the ongoing bloodbath created by the US
invasion and occupation may just get worse, even by orders of magnitude.
On the other hand, since most Iraqis want the US to leave, cool heads among all
of the political factions might just, on their own, get together and form a
unity government that can deal with the oil, with the restoration of services,
with the revitalization of the economy, with the refugee problem, with any
non-Iraqi violent forces there to fight the Americans, and so on and so
forth. But this is still in the realm of “might happen,” of speculation.
There is, however, a third route to US disengagement that
deserves serious discussion, both because it has the prospect of bringing peace
to Iraq following a US departure, and would provide for a peaceful US
departure. Further, it would seriously discomfit the Bush Administration
politically. Presented in the right way it would be very difficult for
them to combat it given the absolute impossibility of their admitting that
Permanent War is their true war aim. It is a route based not on
speculation of what might happen but on the prospect that a truly peaceful
solution both to the conflict between the variety of Iraqi factions that are
fighting the US and the US, and the Iraqi civil wars. Further, it is a
route based on historical precedent.
From 1946 to 1954 France fought to regain its pre-World War
II colonial hold on Indo-China (the modern countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos). While the bulk of the peoples of the region were anti-French,
there was also a major element of civil war, especially in Vietnam which had a
major privileged, pro-French class. If the French had just left
precipitously, which they could have, their forces could have been seriously
compromised in such a withdrawal and civil war might have overtaken the
country. However, an international conference was established to deal
with the situation. Out of it came the 1954 Geneva Agreements, guaranteed
by Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It provided for a peaceful
withdrawal of the French forces, the supposedly temporary division of Vietnam
into northern and southern sections (something absolutely new for that
country), and an agreement to hold elections in the whole country by
1956. Conspicuously, the United States did not sign the Geneva
Agreements. It then proceeded to support the right-wing elements in the
southern part of the country to delay the elections, which were indeed never
held. We all know what eventually happened.
In the case of Iraq, of course, the United States would have
to sign any agreements coming out of a similar international conference and
would thus be bound by the agreements. (They would be bound that is if
the US government was not of the Georgite type, which ignores international
agreements whenever it suits them to do so. But that is another story.)
The conveners of such a conference could be chosen from among: France, Germany,
Russia, China and Indonesia (the country with the world’s largest Muslim
population but without any direct stake in the conflict).
The participants would include the US, the present Iraqi
government, representatives of every major Iraqi faction which pledged to
adhere to any final agreement hammered out, the major bordering powers (as
proposed by the Iraq Study Group): Iran, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
I would also invite independently the Arab League which, should an agreement be
reached, could very well be called upon, perhaps in cooperation with Iran, to
provide security during the transition period. The United Nations would
of course also be a party, especially since it would be the best agency to
handle humanitarian aid after the restoration of peace in the country.
Also, during the transition period, a UN Military Command could be established
to handle a very limited, circumscribed number of functions, one of which would
directly involve peace-keeping. The goal to be announced in advance would be,
just as it was for the former French Indo-China, the peaceful withdrawal of all
foreign military forces and the establishment of a peaceful, democratically
organized Iraq. And how could the Georgites oppose that? (Rove and
Cheney could probably figure out a way, but that is for another time too.)
Among the proposals that a US government other than one
headed by the Georgites could bring to the table would include:
1. The announcement of a date for the end
of US offensive military action in Iraq. This might be combined with
their phased replacement, even in advance of a final agreement, by a combined
Arab League/Iranian force.
2. Propose to the Iraqi government the
repeal of the "Bremer Plan" for the takeover of the Iraqi economy by
foreign investors.
3. Announce a date for the termination of
all US private contracts for security and construction in Iraq, other than
those that might be negotiated by the interim UN Command and the Iraqi
government. Ask Congress to appropriate any funds necessary for the early
termination of contracts with Halliburton, Bechtel, and etc.
4. Shut down all construction of permanent
military bases, with handover of what already exists to the UN Command on an
interim basis. Future disposal would be part of the final settlement
5. Announce support for a comprehensive
Israel-Palestine settlement along the lines of the already privately negotiated
"Geneva Agreement."
6. Renounce any interest in ownership or
control of any Iraqi oil reserves.
7. Announce in advance a final settlement
that would guarantee the Sunni minority a fair share of oil revenues. (If
certain projections for the potential discovery of major oil reserves under the
Iraqi Western Desert, Sunni territory, were to prove correct, this point would
become easier to negotiate.
8. Propose the creation, under UN
leadership, of a new international organization for combating terrorism using
the most sophisticated weapons of intelligence, police work, and focused
military action as indicated.
Obviously, there are many details of such a proposal that
would have to be worked out. But surely professional diplomats on all
sides could do so, assuming that the common goal of establishing a peaceful,
democratic Iraq, were to be agreed to in advance. As noted above, the
Bush Administration could never agree to this because it doesn’t want such a
goal to be reached. But this proposal could also be a powerful political
tool for the Democratic Party: “We want the same goal the Georgites want: a
peaceful, Democratic Iraq. We also want a peaceful withdrawal of US
forces, at the earliest possible time. This is the way both can be
accomplished. The continuing presence of US combat forces only leads all
parties away from achieving the goal, not towards it.” Why in my view,
it’s a slam dunk.