Conn Hallinan – December 12, 2010
On the face of it, it is hard to explain why a minor
collision between a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel this
past August escalated to the point where Beijing and Tokyo came to the edge of
breaking relations. But the
incident mirrors policies that both nations see as vital to their self-interests,
and coupled with an aggressive push by the United States to defend its
traditional power in the region.
The disputed ownership of the tiny scatter of islands in the
East China Sea claimed by China, Japan and Taiwan—the Senkakus to the
Japanese, the Diaoyus to the Chinese—is less about fish than the
potential energy reserves that might lie beneath the string of reefs and
atolls. But for more than 30 years both sides have largely avoided the kind of
confrontation that took place Aug. 7.
In 1978, then Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping proposed that
the parties defer any decision on sovereignty, thereby allowing both sides to
fish in the area. In 1997, the two countries signed the Japan-China Fisheries
Agreement, although the treaty does not cover the area where the confrontation
took place. However, over the past decade both sides have carefully avoided
challenging one another—until Aug. 7.
From the Japanese point of view, the incident reflects an
increasing assertiveness by Beijing in the East and South China seas, areas
that China describe as vital—or “core”—to its security.
From China’s point of view, the arrest of the Chinese
captain was a provocative act that reflects a growing hostility by Japan’s
ruling Democratic Party. And Beijing is certain that the Americans are behind
it all.
In a sense, both side are correct.
Japan’s Democratic Party was elected on a platform of
improving relations with China, renegotiating a new American base agreement on
Okinawa, and distancing itself from Japan’s umbilical linkage to U.S. policies.
But the Obama administration torpedoed the new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama,
by refusing to compromise on the Okinawa base. When Hatoyama folded under the
pressure and resigned, he was replaced by a far more pro-American Prime
Minister, Naoto Kan. From China’s point of view, Washington engineered a coup,
marginalized the more independent-minded wing of the Democratic Party, and
brought Japan back under the U.S. umbrella.
Adding insult to injury, the U.S. has scheduled joint
American-Japanese naval maneuvers near the disputed islands and war games off
Taiwan, the island province that China claims is part of its national
territory. The U.S. recently concluded major naval war games with South Korea
in the Yellow and South China seas, maneuvers that drew a sharp protest from
Beijing.
“[The U.S.] is engaging in an increasingly tight
encirclement of China and constantly challenging China’s core interests.
Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision,” Rear
Admiral Yang Yi wrote in the People’s Liberation Army Daily.
And yet Japan is correct that a powerful current of
nationalism has made China increasingly ready to challenge the traditional
balance of power in Asia. For the past century European powers and Japan
routinely encroached on Chinese territory, slicing off provinces and exploiting
China’s economic resources. China still nurses a grudge over Japan’s brutal
1931-45 invasion.
Historical humiliations do play a role in the current
crisis, but if there is one thing that drives China’s foreign policy, it is,
access to energy to fuel the country’s explosive industrialization. To that end, China has built ties
with Iran, the “Stans” of Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Much of the
oil and gas that keeps China’s factories humming comes by sea, and Beijing is
increasingly concerned about the delicacy of its energy jugular vein. Close off
the Malacca Straits between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula and those factories
go silent.
Therefore, when the U.S. and it allies, Japan and South
Korea, carry out naval war games in the Indian Ocean and the waters near China,
Beijing responds by beefing up its navy and vigorously defending what it
considers its economic zone. But that gives the U.S. an opportunity to build
alliances in the region and keep its irons in the fire.
Take China’s claim on the Spratlys and the Paracels, two
groups of islands in the South China Sea. The islands are also claimed by
Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. China has seized more
than 60 Vietnamese fishing boats in the area.
The countries with claims on the Spratlys and Paracels want
to negotiate with China as a bloc, but Beijing insists on dealing with the
dispute nation by nation. The standoff allowed the Americans to jump in and
offer to mediate the issue. From China’s point of view, the U.S. is using the
dispute to inject itself into one of its “core” regions and pull Vietnam and
others into an alliance against China. To the countries involved, China is
being a bully, and if the U.S. wants to help out, that is fine by them.
There are other bones of contention in the region.
Future water supplies concern the Chinese, because a major
source of its water is the Himalayas, where glaciers are rapidly retreating in
the face of climate change. Countries that border the mountain range are
supposed to consult with one another, but China is busily building dams to
corner much of the runoff.
There are historical tensions in the region as well. India
lost a hefty slice of territory to China in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and,
since 2005, Beijing has come to call Indian-controlled Arunachal Pradesh border
area “South Tibet.” There are also reports that China is building up its
military forces in this area.
While some rightist forces in India talk openly about an
armed conflict with China, that seems unlikely. China has been wary of war
since its disastrous 1979 invasion of Vietnam, and, while it defines its
southern border with India as a “core” area, neither country can afford a war,
particularly one that has the potential to go nuclear.
Nevertheless, the border dispute has had the effect of
strengthening ties between New Delhi and Washington.
Taiwan is another “core” area, but the U.S. is selling arms
to Taiwan and holding joint naval exercises with Japan aimed at stopping a
Chinese invasion of the island. However, recent polls in Taiwan indicate that
its residents have little fear of an invasion, and Taiwan and China have even
carried out joint search and rescue maneuvers. China accuses the Americans of
stirring up trouble, but it is China’s refusal to take a possible invasion of
Taiwan off the table that allows the U.S. to keep a foot in the door.
The U.S. and Japan view North Korea as an unstable and
dangerous nuclear threat. From China’s point of view, the U.S. and its allies
want North Korea to collapse, which would not only flood China with refugees,
but put U.S. ally South Korea on China’s southern border.
There is no question but that the Americans are trying to
surround China with military forces and an alliance system hostile to what
Beijing sees as its basic interests. There is also no question but that China’s
need for energy, water, and security have led it to exert itself in ways it has
not done in a very long time. For Japan and the U.S., that will take some
getting used to.
But none of the tensions are insurmountable.
U.S. armed
forces in China’s backyard are a potential threat, but Chinese belligerence in
places like the Spratlys and Tibet give the U.S. a rationale for maintaining
its military power in Asia.
Energy needs are global, and need not be turned into a
competition. Himalayan water is
not just a problem for India and China, but Central Asia, South Asia and
Southeast Asia as well.
There are signs that the sides are trying to bank the fires.
The Chinese agreed to re-establish military-to-military meetings with the U.S.
and Beijing, and Tokyo made nice during the recent Asia-Europe summit in
Brussels.
National problems have regional consequences, as regional
problems increasingly take on a global dimension. These are the work for a strengthened and more democratic
United Nations. The alternatives should keep one up at night.