By Michael
Faulkner – August 02, 2009
“To go to
war is to leave oneself at the mercy of the unexpected. How far it will spread
and how many lives it will cost depends on the capricious roulette of war. One
thing alone is certain. The further we get in, the harder it will be to get
out.”
These words
were written in 1965 by the percipient US radical reporter, I.F. Stone. He was
referring, of course, to the war in Vietnam, which Democratic President Johnson
was then pushing to a new stage of escalation. The war lasted another ten years
before it ended in total defeat for the United States at a cost of 58.000
American lives and countless hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese lives. Many
years later, formerly gung-ho former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara,
reflected on the war that he had prosecuted so enthusiastically, and pronounced
it to have been “wrong, terribly wrong.”
The
December 2008 Letter from the U.K. (The Great Game, Then and Now) concluded
that “unless a determined effort is made to seek a diplomatic solution, which
means talking to the Taliban, this latest Afghan war will last a long, long
time.” British, U.S. and other NATO forces have now been engaged in Afghanistan
for nearly eight years. It is
worth recalling that the Soviets, in support of a weak client government, spent
ten years attempting to subdue the U.S.-backed mujahedeen at a cost of about
13.000 Russian lives. They failed. There is no reason to suppose that the U.S.
and Britain will be any more successful.
At present
there are approximately 91.000 foreign troops in Afghanistan of whom 59.000 are
American and 9.000 British. There have been 1.200 western – mainly
American - casualties in since 2001. (No-one is counting the Afghan casualties
but they run into many thousands – 140 were killed in one U.S. air attack
alone in May.) In December 132
British soldiers had been killed in Helmand province. The figure now stands at
nearly 200, fifteen of whom were killed during ten days in July by roadside
bombs. No-one pretends that the
casualty rate is likely to decline, so, if the war continues into 2010, as it
certainly will, a rising death-toll is to be expected. The government and the generals admit
as much, but, surprisingly they also say that there can be no purely military
solution to the conflict. Just as
in Vietnam, they talk about “winning hearts and minds”. The operation in
Helmand which involves 9.000 British and 10.000 U.S. troops, is supposedly
intended to “clear, hold and build” the province – that is, to clear it of
Taliban and make it safe for the locals who will then be able to live in peace.
This, we are told, is the purpose of the “mission.” The Afghan war is supposed to be “the good war”, the
“ethically just” war, different from the Iraq war which is now almost
universally condemned as an indefensible disaster. But in Britain the public
remains stubbornly unconvinced.
Since the
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 attempts to justify it have changed
considerably. In the wake of 9/11 there was widespread sympathy for the
declared objective of destroying al Qaeda and capturing or killing Osama Bin
Laden. Neither of these objectives
was accomplished, and Bush and Blair turned their attention towards Iraq and
Saddam Hussein, who they falsely claimed was in league with al Qaeda and
possessed weapons of mass destruction. “Mission drift” in Afghanistan has
involved replacing one outworn explanation with another – and another.
The “mission” was variously described as one to bring democracy to the country;
to emancipate women from the Taliban tyranny; to put a stop to the trade in
heroin. More recently it has been asserted that the Taliban must be beaten to
prevent Afghanistan becoming a hotbed of terrorism from which suicide bombers
will be unleashed onto the streets of London. The government is obviously
worried that the message is not getting through. There is no serious discussion
about the purpose of Britain’s involvement in the war. When British forces were
first deployed in Helmand province three years ago the defence secretary at the
time, John Reid, confidently asserted that he did not expect a shot to be
fired. The soldiers would be employed in peaceful construction projects,
winning “hearts and minds”. As the
death toll has mounted in recent months, the television news channels have
carried nightly images of the military funeral corteges, with union flag-draped
coffins, moving solemnly through the streets of the small Wiltshire town of
Wootton Bassett past silent ranks of mourners. There is no public enthusiasm for
this war. The claim that soldiers are sacrificing their lives to protect the
homeland from terrorist attack is not widely believed.
One needs
no special knowledge of the international scene during the last eight years to
understand that the breeding ground for jihadi terrorism is in Pakistan rather
than Afghanistan. The Taliban,
though they are repugnant medieval bigots of the worst kind, are hardly worse
than the other varieties of tribal warlords that thrive in Afghanistan. They
have not launched terrorist attacks on western cities, but they have
demonstrated their fanatical determination to fight to the bitter end against
any foreign invaders. They, and the assortment of other warriors who take up
arms, will not be subdued. Afghanistan is not a national state. Hardly a state
at all, it is rather, an uncontrollable territory to whose unruly tribesmen
central government has always been inimical. To throw increasing numbers of British soldiers into that
cauldron is ignorance bordering on insanity. The war cannot be won.
This is
true but it cannot be admitted. For the government, the Afghan imbroglio is
going from bad to worse but they are publicly committed to seeing it through.
As the casualty figures continue to rise it becomes more difficult to admit that
the mission has failed. It must be pretended that “our lads” are dying in a
noble cause – in defence of all our liberties. But the problem is made
infinitely worse for the government because it is clear to everyone that the
troops are ill-equipped to fight the kind of war they are engaged in. The light armoured vehicles to which
they continue to be assigned are vulnerable to deadly attacks by roadside
bombs, a method of fighting in which the Taliban have developed considerable
expertise. Most of the casualties have been sustained in this way. To avoid
such casualties, more heavily armoured vehicles are needed, but are not
supplied in the quantities required. The alternative means of mobility in
Helmand is by helicopter, but these are in short supply to the British army.
All this is well known and freely admitted by head of the army, General Sir
Richard Dannatt, who, to emphasise the point, recently paid a visit to
front-line troops in a U.S. helicopter. Even members of Brown’s cabinet have
blurted out the truth, only to be told by the prime minister to shut up. The
truth is that the treasury cannot afford to pay for the war. It is being fought
on the cheap.
It should
not be inferred from this that better funding and better equipment will tip the
balance in favour of the NATO forces. No matter how many helicopters and
heavily armoured Land Rovers are employed, or how many thousands more troops
are despatched, the outcome will be the same as it was for the Soviets twenty
years ago. Ground to air missiles will be used by the Taliban and the
helicopters will be shot down.
Another
argument that has recently emerged is that the NATO forces are fighting to
ensure that the elections scheduled for August are allowed to take place free
from intimidation. Behind this is the assumption that it will be a democratic
process. It is hoped that Hamid Karzai will win and go on to build an army
capable of taking on the Taliban. These are pipe dreams. Karzai’s government is
sunk in corruption and his notion of democratic politics is doing deals with
powerbrokers and tribal warlords. Who could possibly expect anything different?
There is
another explanation for General Dannatt’s determination to “see it through” in
Afghanistan: the reputation of the British Army. Iraq was disastrous for the
army brass. They have been compelled to withdraw without honour. The generals
feel the humiliation keenly and smart under the perceived criticism from their
closest ally about poor performance in Iraq. “Credibility”, said Dannatt, “is linked to the vital
currency of reputation. And in this respect there is recognition that our
national and military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, have been
called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally
as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign….Taking steps to restore this
credibility will be pivotal, and Afghanistan provides the opportunity.”
The
bereaved relatives of those who have died and those who will continue to die in
Afghanistan, may not find this explanation for their sacrifice all that
reassuring. But we should all heed
I.F. Stone’s warning from a bygone war – “the further we get in, the
harder it will be to get out.” 