Conn Hallinan - August 28, 2011
Kabul,
Afghanistan-American and allied forces in Afghanistan are strengthening a
layered defense along the border with Pakistan to seize Haqqani network
militants as they try to make their way to Kabul to carry out spectacular
attacks, according to senior military officers---New York Times, 8/1/11
Okay, New York Times, time for a little geography lesson,
with a few bits of history thrown in.
Let’s start with that old Rand McNally three-dimensional map
of the world that formerly graced the walls of grammar schools across the
country (I happen to have one in my closet). It has low spots to demonstrate
deep-sea trenches and bumps for mountain ranges. Among the biggest set of bumps
are the Hindu Kush (the western extension of the Himalayas) that corresponds to
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The highest of those bumps is Mt.
Noshaq (24,580 ft).
This is also a very long border, 1,510 miles more or less
(more on that later). Think of the distance between Portland, ME and Miami, FL,
New York City and Dallas/Fort Worth, or London and Moscow. It is mostly really
big bumps, (except some lower ones on the western edge of the border), so it is
not only long, it contains some of the most formidable terrain on the planet.
In fact the “official” border is marked from Sikaram Peak to
Laman Peak. It is always a bad idea to fight a war where you measure the
battlefield by the distance between peaks. If there are general rules of war,
certainly one of them is: “Do not fight in places that the Rand McNally
three-dimensional map puts lots of bumps.”
This is also not a border, in the normal sense of word, with
the striped guardhouses and border checks. For one thing, the Afghans and the
Pakistanis had nothing to do with establishing it. That was done—with
considerable mischief in mind— in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, then
England’s lead colonial officer in India (Pakistan did not yet exist).
His plan was to split up the Pashtuns—an ethnic group
who have populated the region since at least the fifth century BC—so that
they would not constitute a majority in either region. Pashtuns make up about
42 percent of Afghanistan and about 15 percent of Pakistan. The Pashtuns have
never recognized the Durand Line, and neither has the government in Kabul. This
makes Pakistan nervous, because aside from India, one of the things Islamabad
fears most is ethnic dismemberment: the establishment of an independent
Pashtunistan.
Pashtuns on both sides of the border are bound by a common
language, culture and kinship system, so independence is hardly out of the question.
Pashtuns are among the most hospitable people in the world,
but they don’t like being invaded or occupied, which no one has successfully
managed to do, although many have tried. A 19th century British general
remarked that when one gets ready to invade the area, the first thing to do is
plan a line of retreat, the inevitable course followed by all militaries.
So now, let’s look at “layered defense along the border,” as
well as American pressure on the Pakistani military “to cleanse their border of
militants.”
First, from the Pashtuns’ point of view, Pakistan’s military
is just as much a foreign intruder as were the Greeks, Buddhists, Mongols, Muslims, and
British, and Islamabad’s army would have just about the same level of success
as all those other invaders. Second, any attempt to “cleanse” the border would
stir up major hostilities among the tribes and clans in both countries and feed
Pashtun nationalism, which is exactly what Islamabad does not want to do.
But even if Pakistan was to decide to actually try to
“cleanse” the border, Islamabad has neither the manpower nor the money to do so
(even if it were possible, which history argues it is not). Pakistan has some
1.4 million men under arms, but only a little over 600,000 of those are regular
troops. The rest are reserves or border police and local paramilitaries. And
most of those troops have to be kept on the border with India, with which
Pakistan has fought three wars.
Pakistan’s military is currently engaged both in fighting
its own domestic Taliban in South Waziristan and maintaining troops in North
Waziristan, but the North West Frontier and Federally Administered Tribal
Areas—the part of the world we are talking about—are vast tracts of
terrain, and “pacifying” them is quite beyond the capabilities of any army in
the world, let alone Pakistan’s.
The situation is not much different on the Afghan side of
the border. The combined NATO forces are about 132,000, of which 100,000 are
Americans (although 4,000 are headed home in the next few months). However,
with the exception of the British, Canadians and Australians, most of the
allied troops are not involved in active combat, so the actual number of troops
available is closer 110,000. And not all of those troops fight. Some drive
trucks, some handle supplies and logistics, some man bases. The final number of
fighters? Maybe 60,000.
The Afghan Army is somewhere between 150,000 and
171,000—the exact number is hard to pin down because so many desert
within the first few months—of which only several thousand—two
brigades— are capable of fighting on their own. There are also134,000
Afghan police, but they don’t fight. In fact, according to most Afghans, they
mostly extort.
You can’t put all those U.S., allied, and Afghan troops on
the Pakistan border, particularly since the Taliban have spread their attacks
to formally “pacified” areas of the country, in the north, east and west. And.
in any case, the Afghan Army is still training (although it is curious that
while the Taliban soldiers receive virtually no training, they are able to hold
their own in battle with the most sophisticated and well-trained military force
in the world).
For arguments sake, let’s say you could put a mix of 40,000
troops on the border, a border of massive mountains and deep valleys, a border
filled with passes, trade routes and goat trails, a border that stretches 1,510
miles. With 20,000 troops, the British Army could not seal the 224-mile border
between southern and Northern Ireland.
The Taliban are mostly Pashtun, although not all Pashtun are
Taliban. Polls indicate that about 12 percent to 15 percent of the Pashtun
support the group. But the vast majority of Pashtuns recognize that sooner or
later, the Kabul government and the U.S. will have to sit down and make a deal
with the Taliban for some kind of coalition government. The lack of support for
the insurgents does not mean the Pashtun will betray them. Since the Haqqanis
are Pashtun, they can cross this border virtually anyplace, and, as the last
few weeks have illustrated, the Taliban and their allies can strike almost
anywhere.
The problem with all this nonsense about “thickening the
Afghan border” is not the “senior military officials”— generals lie, it’s
part of their job description—but that the New York Times would print
this blather.
It is not only silly, it feeds dangerous illusions at a time
when clear thinking is called for. As Gareth Porter of IPS News reports, “The
Taliban leadership is ready to negotiate peace with the United States right now
if Washington indicates its willingness to provide a timetable for a complete
withdrawal.” According to Porter, the Taliban are willing to break any ties
with al-Qaeda and won’t even demand a withdrawal date. The only thing they will
insist upon are no U.S. bases.
So why isn’t the Times reporting this breakthrough instead of peddling foolishness?